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I. INTRODUCTION
Children generally grow up wanting to do at least as well as their
parents. For most of us that challenge seems reasonably attainable, at least
in our early years. Albert Gore, Jr. was no exception even though his father
was a U.S. Senator who reputedly played a major role in the creation of the
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Interstate Highway System. During the presidential campaign of 1992, the
younger Gore, with support and encouragement from Bill Clinton, pro-
posed that the U.S. government fund construction of an "Information Su-
perhighway" capable of carrying two-way switched video signals to every
home and business in America by 2015; the same year the Japanese had
targeted for completing a similarly ubiquitous broadband system in their
country.1
Ronald Brown, then Chairman of the National Democratic Party, du-
tifully echoed the views of the future President and Vice President on this
issue, but when he was installed as Secretary of Commerce, he recognized
that governing the country required more than campaign rhetoric. With the
combination of brutal candor and disarming modesty that made him such
an effective Secretary, he sent a message downstairs to the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration (NTIA), saying, "This
information superhighway we've been advocating-can you tell us what it
is?"2
The career civil servants at the NTIA responded by noting estimates
that the kind of system being advocated by the Vice President would cost
200 to 400 billion dollars, and politely inquired if the Administration in-
tended to seek a direct appropriation of those funds from Congress.3 The
staff noted in passing that the private sector was already investing ap-
proximately 50 billion dollars per year in the U.S. communications infra-
1. The Japanese have since delayed and softened their fibered-nation target and are
beginning to place more reliance on competition to drive development of their telecommu-
nications sector. How significant a role Albert Gore, Sr. actually played in the creation of
the Interstate Highway System is irrelevant for purposes of this Article. What is relevant is
that his son believed him to have played a significant role and saw that as setting a standard
for accomplishment in his family.
2. As Senior Policy Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communica-
tions and Information from 1989 through 1993, the Author was a participant in some of the
Clinton Administration's early deliberations on communications policy issues. Having
served in a prior Administration that had a self-admitted problem with "the vision thing,"
the Author intends no disrespect for campaign rhetoric. Rather, he views it as a necessary
and important, but not sufficient, part of the policy formation process. Except for incum-
bents running for re-election, candidates for public office rarely have access to the analyti-
cal resources that will become available to them after they are elected. For that reason, vot-
ers should both permit and encourage elected officials to re-examine and, if necessary,
modify prior campaign proposals.
3. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIvENESS, THE COMMUNICATIONS REVO-
LUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY: REMOVING BARRIERS TO GROWTH 51 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter
COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL REPORT] (prepared by Charles M. Oliver & James Gattuso with
assistance from several federal agencies). The report was circulated internally among gov-
ernment offices and "concisely articulates the vision which... helped guide the Bush Ad-
ministration's telecommunications policies over.., four years." Letter of Transmittal from
David M. McIntosh, Executive Director, Council on Competitiveness, to Sen. Trent Lott
(Jan. 15, 1993).
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structure, and further noted that a minor change in price cap formulas ap-
plied to telephone companies could by itself liberate enough capital to
fund the desired system, without any taxpayer money being required.4
As it turned out, the Administration was less interested in pumping
taxpayer money into the telecommunications sector than skimming a little
off the top, and supported legislation authorizing radio license auctions
that have thus far generated more than 20 billion dollars for the general
treasury.5 But Vice President Gore and, to a lesser extent, President Clin-
ton, maintained their interest in the information superhighway, even while
modifying their approach to pursue the objective using regulatory incen-
tives instead of taxpayer dollars.
The Administration's evolving telecommunications policy eventually
led to a compromise with Republican ideologists and business lobbyists to
6produce the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act or 1996 Act). Aspects
of the 1996 Act have generated severe criticism, but the colliding vectors
of mutually conflicting ideologies and special interests have produced a
result that is surprisingly progressive in concept, though it remains to be
seen whether the practical results will live up to the stated purposes of the
legislation. A comprehensive review of the 1996 Act's many provisions is
beyond the scope of this Article; for context, it suffices to observe that the
core of the 1996 Act is a quid pro quo in which the Regional Bell Operat-
ing Companies (RBOCs) must expose their local exchange telecommuni-
cations businesses to competition and, in return, will be permitted to enter
the long-distance telecommunications and equipment manufacturing busi-
7
nesses.
How does this giant compromise affect the Information Superhigh-
way? It fills in a missing piece of the puzzle that Secretary Brown and
Vice President Gore were facing at the beginning of the Clinton Admini-
4. In January of 1993, the FCC's price cap plan required LECs to reduce their rates
subject to federal jurisdiction by 3.3% per year, after adjusting for "exogenous" variables
like inflation. Deloitte & Touche estimated that setting federal and state price cap reduction
targets at 2% per year, rather than 3.3%, and dedicating the 1.3% difference to infrastruc-
ture improvement could generate an investment pool of $200 to $400 billion by the year
2015. COMPETIVENESS COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 51 (citing Policy and Rules Con-
cerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Second Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 68 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 226 (1990)). The price cap rules have since been substantially modified.
5. When properly implemented, radio license auctions can be an effective tool for en-
couraging economically efficient use of radio spectrum. What should be done with the pro-
ceeds is a separate issue. See Charles Oliver, Domestic Spectrum Regulation in the United
States, in WORLDWIDE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 135 (Frank S. Barnes et al. eds., 1995).
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
7. For a summary of telecommunications provisions of the 1996 Act, see infra Part
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stration. Under the price cap formulas in effect at the time, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) required the larger
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to reduce their prices by about
three percent per year, after adjusting for factors beyond their control such
as inflation and changes in the tax code. Requiring them to reduce their
prices by only about two percent per year would, in principle, leave
enough money on the table to build a broadband information superhighway
reaching nearly every American home and business by the year 2015. But
what would guarantee that the money would be applied for that purpose?
If the guarantee came in the form of administrative edicts, then the
government would be acting like the former Soviet Union's economic
ministries, issuing top-down directives to use any technology in stated
quantities. At this juncture of the analysis, the Vice President and his advi-
sors began to look at the potential benefits of competition-not from an
ideological perspective, but as a more flexible means of driving the system
toward the result they had originally intended, with more responsiveness to
evolving technology and consumer demand.
There was substantial precedent from earlier competitive openings in
the communications marketplace. When third parties were allowed to con-
nect customer premises equipment to the predivestiture network of AT&T,
the competitive market produced fax machines and telecommunicating
computers. When competitors were allowed to enter the long-distance
business, users discovered that Sprint's all-fiber network produced no-
ticeably better quality than AT&T's microwave relay network, and the
telephone giant was forced to take multibillion dollar write-offs and invest
heavily in new technology just to stay in the game. Enhanced data com-
munication services, which had been deregulated and opened to competi-
tion since 1980, were already generating tens of billions of dollars a year
in revenues and starting to coalesce into the entity we know today as the
Internet. 9 Even in local exchange networks, where nascent competitors
were just beginning to provide access links to long-distance carriers at the
beginning of the Clinton Administration, some of the new entrants were
providing superior service through innovations like self-healing fiber rings
that automatically rerouted calls when lines were broken. Based on prior
experience, there was every reason to believe that the introduction of full
8. See supra note 4.
9. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 669, modi-
fied by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 48 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1107
(1980), affd and clarified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsidera-
tion, 88 F.C.C.2d 512, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 629 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and
Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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competition into the local exchange market could not only drive prices
downward; it would probably drive quality and capacity upward. In fact,
competition might drive high technology even without a deceleration in
the downward movement of price cap targets. 10
In the end, the Clinton-Gore team's analysis led it, if not to the same
conclusion as conservative ideologists, at least to a point where a reason-
able compromise could be reached. The upshot was a result that made con-
siderably more sense than either of the two extremes. The early Gore ap-
proach would have required a reversion to Soviet-style diktats, but the,
more extreme proponents of laissez-faire principles were equally naive in
their belief that deregulation alone would produce a satisfactory result.
Gore was smart and, therefore, educable; the Libertarians and the tele-
phone companies' lobbyists were smart and saw a Democratic filibuster
and possible presidential veto on the track they were following.
Whether by accident or design, the legislative outcome was consis-
tent with a recognition that competition in local telecommunications ex-
changes can take root and flourish only if government requires the mo-
nopolists-the ILECs-to expose separated portions of their networks to
competition. It would have been unreasonable to expect any new entrant to
compete across the board with all the services offered by the ILECs, and it
might have been economically inefficient as well to require every com-
peting carrier to run its own wires or fibers into every home or business.
The legislation requires at least the nine largest ILECs, and poten-
tially others, to unbundle their networks and make the parts available sepa-
rately to competitors." So far, the unbundled element being sought most
avidly by competitors is the so-called local loop, the wire, or in some
cases, the optical fiber running between the end user's premises and its
first point of contact with the switching network. Most of the competitive
10. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of competition on the deployment of
high technology in the telecommunications industry, see CoMPETmrvENEss COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-24.
11. For a discussion of the circumstances under which local exchange telephone com-
panies may be exposed to, or shielded from, competition under the 1996 Act, see infra Part
II.
12. For Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), the Act requires, at a minimum, that cus-
tomers and competitors must be able to obtain, on a separate stand-alone basis: local loop
transmission from the customer's premises to the nearest telephone switching office; local
switching unbundled from transmission services; or trunk lines running between telephone
company offices, unbundled from switching. The BOCs are also required to provide non-
discriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and
completion. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(c)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997). Subject to exemptions for certain categories of carriers,
ILECs are required to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecom-
munications carrier, interconnection with the ILEC's network "at any technically feasible
Number 1]
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local exchange carriers (CLECs) believe that they are capable of installing
their own switches and connecting those switches to each other with trunk
lines, but most CLECs can justify running their own cables all the way to
end user premises only for big customers spending thousands of dollars a
month on telecommunications. To make their services available to me-
dium- and small-sized customers, they must be able to lease existing local
loops from the ILECs and connect those loops to CLEC equipment.
Here we begin to approach the vortex that Congress dared not enter.
Unbundling only matters if the unbundled element is made available at a
price that is commensurate with the limited nature of the service being
sought and obtained by the competitor. If an unbundled local loop costs as
much as end-to-end telephone service, for example, the unbundling is a
useless myth. Somebody has to set the prices, and it would be impossible
for Congress to perform that role. Yet, if the prices were set wrongly, the
entire superstructure would collapse and the 1996 Act might as well not
have been passed.
Here, also, we encounter a series of potentially serious conundrums.
Setting prices of unbundled elements in an economically efficient manner
implies that such prices should bear some rational relationship to cost, but
most analysts believe that the monopolized portion of the telecommunica-
tions service sector is rife with implicit subsidies, with some services
priced well above cost and others priced either below cost or with substan-
tially lower margins. If retail prices for some services continue to be set at
a level well above cost, and the underlying network elements are made
available at or near cost, the result is an open invitation for resellers to cir-
cumvent the existing retail pricing structure by subscribing to unbundled
network elements.
If policy makers were writing on a blank slate and were not subject to
political pressures, a strong argument could be made for a thoroughly cost-
based network. The problem is that the deployment of people and re-
sources in businesses, communities, and to some extent even entire states,
is premised in part on the existing telecommunications rate structure. Po-
litically, the process is driven in part by the system of government given to
us by the Founding Fathers, which provides a disproportionate influence to
rural states in the U.S. Senate. The authors of the 1996 Act recognized that
cost-based interconnection to unbundled network elements would tend to
drive hidden subsidies out of the system, and provided a mechanism for
point." 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(2).
13. Cable Television operators and electrical utilities may become exceptions to this
rule as new technologies are developed, enabling them to provide telephone and data serv-
ices over their existing facilities.
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establishing a system of explicit subsidies designed to preserve some, but
not all, aspects of the status quo ante, and to provide new subsidies to
schools, libraries, and rural health service providers.
This Article addresses the vulnerabilities of existing stakeholders-as
well as their opportunities-in the ongoing processes by which the 1996
Act is being implemented. The analysis begins with a brief description of
the status quo ante, followed by a summary of provisions of the 1996 Act
that are most salient to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and their equip-
ment suppliers. This Article then discusses the three most important im-
plementation proceedings at the FCC: dealing with interconnection issues,
subsidies, and access charges. The important roles played by the courts and
the states are also addressed. This Article concludes with a strategic analy-
sis that addresses the Vice President's vision of the information super-
highway in the context of practical constraints.
II. THE STATUS Quo ANTE-BEFORE THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
After starting with the FCC's Carterfone decision in 1968,4 compe-
tition in the U.S. telecommunications sector by 1996 had spread to include
customer premises equipment, value-added resale services, and long-
distance services, including satellite. The last bastion of monopoly was the
local telephone exchange, and it was heavily regulated. Prices in local ex-
changes (including so-called "exchange access" charges applied to long-
distance carriers for the privilege of traversing local exchanges) were
heavily politicized. The local exchange was the natural habitat for any
price' trolls in the telecommunications sector.
The idea of trolls in this context is, admittedly, an imprecise analogy.
Trolls do not purport to serve the public interest. The better analogy is the
family in William Faulkner's novel, The Reivers,15 that provided a for-
profit service extracting passersby from a ford where their vehicles became
mired. The family would use their mule for plowing the ford when it was
not hauling cars, but motorists always welcomed its assistance.
Prior to adoption and implementation of the 1996 Act, all interstate,
interexchange telecommunications carriers (IXCs) that used local ex-
change switching facilities to complete their calls were required to pay
14. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 597, reconsideration denied by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.2d 571, 14 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 185 (1968). The Carterfone
was a device connecting mobile radio systems to the toll telephone network.
15. WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE REIVERS (1962).
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per-minute carrier charges to the local exchange carriers (LECs).16 These
charges provided support for explicit subsidies, the Universal Service Fund
and Lifeline Assistance, 7 amounting to about 750 million dollars in 1996,
as well as a number of hidden subsidies buried in charges for various
services." As discussed below, the hidden subsidies were larger than the
explicit subsidies by at least an order of magnitude. IXCs passed the bur-
den of these contributions along to end users, generally asserting that about
forty percent of the charges for interstate telephone calls were attributable
to the cost of local exchange access.'9
The pre-Act regulatory environment was replete with loopholes that
enabled major users to limit their contributions to telecommunications
subsidies. No per-minute or special access charges were applied to any
termination of a line that by nature of its operating characteristics could
not make use of common lines used to provide public switched telephone
service, and a similar exemption applied to any termination of a line that
the customer certified was not connected to a private branch exchange
(PBX) or other device capable of interconnecting a local exchange sub-
scriber line with the customer's private line.' Many major users availed
themselves of the latter exemption by attesting that they had partitioned
their PBXs, thereby claiming that their private lines were not connected to
the public switched network.2 Neither the FCC nor the carriers had any
practicable means of checking the veracity of these assertions. This ex-
emption was a legitimate and credible resource for ISPs providing Internet
access services to business via private lines, because for that kind of serv-
ice there is little reason to connect the lines being used with public
switched network facilities.
A more controversial exemption applied to ISPs like America Online,
which serves many residential and small business users that access the
service on a dial-up basis, using the public switched network. Because
ISPs and other enhanced service providers are not carriers, they were (and
still are) treated as end users and allowed to connect with the public
switched network by subscribing to local business line services, which for
16. 47 C.F.R. § 69.5(b) (1996).
17. Id. § 69.4(c).
18. Id. § 69.4(b). The introductory language of this section has been modified. 62 Fed.
Reg. 31,932 (1997).
19. WorldCom Tucks in-Again, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 67.
20. 47 C.F.R. § 69.115(e)(4).
21. Id. § 69.115(e)(6).
22. See Clarification of §§ 69.5 and 69.115 of the Rules of the FCC, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1630 (1985).
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incoming calls are widely available for flat monthly rates.23 This exemp-
tion attracted more attention than the private line exceptions because it dif-
ferentiated between enhanced service providers and carriers using local
switching facilities in a seemingly identical fashion to complete long-
distance calls, with voice calls falling prey to per-minute subsidy contri-
bution requirements, while enhanced service providers continued to enjoy
flat monthly charges. The FCC also believed that it had legal authority to
apply per-minute access charges to enhanced service providers even
though it refrained from doing so, whereas, before the 1996 Act was
adopted, the Commission did not seem to believe that it had legal authority
to require subsidy contributions from users of private lines that were not
connected to the public switched network. The Commission had initiated a
rulemaking proceeding to eliminate the enhanced services provider ex-
emption, but terminated the proceeding in 1988 in the face of intense po-
24litical opposition from users of on-line services.
III. KEY PRovISIoNs OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1996
As mentioned above, the core of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 is a quid pro quo: the RBOCs will be allowed to get into the long-
distance25 and manufacturing businesses, in return for which they must
open their markets to local competition.27 The titanic lobbying struggle that
preceded this legislation never questioned the basic terms of that bargain.
The battle was fought over the terms and conditions that would be imposed
28
on the BOCs as a condition precedent to their liberation.
The 1996 Act provides only part of the answer. The rest of the an-
23. The enhanced service provider exemption was embodied in 47 C.F.R. § 69.2(m)
(1996), which for purposes of access charges defined an end user as any customer of an in-
terstate or foreign telecommunications service that was not a carrier. Enhanced services are
defined as services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate
communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format,
content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; pro-
vide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber
interaction with stored information. The FCC does not classify enhanced service providers
as common carriers. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1996).
24. Amendments of Part 69 of the Comm'n's Rules Relating to Enhanced Serv. Pro-
viders, Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 2631, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1294 (1988).
25. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 151(a), § 271, 47
U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1997).
26. Id. § 273.
27. Id. § 251.
28. RBOC and BOC are often used as interchangeable terms. The enterprises are actu-
ally structured as regional holding companies, each owning several Bell Operating Compa-
nies.
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swer is being decided in litigation that is assuming complexity of Bosnian
proportions, involving overlapping jurisdictions and criss-crossing lines of
appeal. The Act sets forth general principles that are supposed to expose
the BOCs, GTE, and Sprint to competition, and could expose other LECs
to competition as well, depending upon decisions by state regulators.29 The
FCC is directed to establish regulations to implement interconnection and
unbundling requirements," but interpretation of the FCC's rules will be
rendered by state public utility commissions.3' These independent and
far-flung entities, never known for docile and tractable adherence to FCC
policies in the past, are conjured by the legislation to ensure that LECs
meet the requirements of the statute and the FCC's implementing regula-
tions. Parties aggrieved by state commission decisions are invited to ap-
peal-not to the FCC, not to a state court of appeals-but to a local federal
32district court. In October 1997, the incoming FCC Chairman designate
testified that ILECs had filed seventy-three challenges to state commission
3decisions in the courts. These avenues could be overlaid with FCC com-
plaint proceedings or federal preemption initiatives.
For the BOCs, this picture requires more detail. The BOCs must go
through a separate and additional set of procedures when seeking permis-
sion to provide interLATA services in a given state or engage in manu-
facturing.M ("InterLATA" refers to service between local access and trans-
port areas, each of which typically includes no more than one metropolitan
statistical area or consolidated statistical area.) The FCC is directed to re-
view BOC applications claiming compliance with the open competition
requirements applicable to BOCs,35 which are consistent with, but more
fully articulated than requirements applicable to all nonexempt LECs.36
The FCC is empowered to grant or deny these BOC applications and exer-
cise continuing oversight thereafter, with authority to impose penalties or
suspend or revoke approvals. The FCC is directed to "consult" with the
relevant state commission (and the U.S. Attorney General) before reaching
a decision, but the FCC is not required to follow the state's (or the Attor-
29. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(a)-(e) (establishing interconnection requirements); Id.
§ 251(f) (authorizing state commissions to exempt certain rural telephone companies from
some interconnection requirements).
30. Id. § 251(d).
31. Id. § 252(f)(2).
32. Id. § 252(e)(6).
33. Lott Aims to Force Vote on FCC Nominees this Week, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 27,
1997, at 1.
34. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d).
35. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B).
36. Compare id., with 47 U.S.C.A. § 251.
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ney General's) advice.37 Parties aggrieved by FCC decisions reached under
this procedure may seek review by a federal court of appeals .3
The implications for procedural confusion are breathtaking even to
attorneys long inured to complex and protracted litigation. A BOC could
see its open competition plan approved or disapproved by a state commis-
sion, then find itself in a federal district court. An identical or opposite de-
cision could be reached by the FCC, with a simultaneous appeal to a fed-
eral court of appeals. Since the court of appeals could be in a different
circuit than the district court, the two lines of decision might never be rec-
onciled, absent a decision by the Supreme Court to take up the matter. This
scenario only portrays the extent of conflict possible over one controversy,
without even beginning to address the potential inconsistencies among dis-
parate LEC plans.
A. Open Competition Requirements
Procedural complexities aside, the open competition requirements
contained in the legislation bear a remarkable resemblance to wish lists
that facilities-based competitive access providers have been circulating for
several years.
LECs are directed to unbundle their networks and allow interconnec-
tion at any technically feasible point, with competitive providers allowed
to pick and choose what portions of those networks they will use-paying
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory prices for the use of those selected
piece-parts.39 For BOCs, this means, at a minimum, that customers and
competitors must be able to obtain, on a separate stand-alone basis, local
loop transmission from the customer's premises to the nearest telephone
switching office; local switching unbundled from transmission services; or
trunk lines running between telephone company offices, unbundled from
switching.40 The BOCs are also required to provide nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing andS 41
completion.
Competitive providers are given the right to locate their equipment
on the premises of an incumbent LEC, unless the LEC can demonstrate
that doing so would be impractical. 42
A LEC is required to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecom-
37. Id. § 271(d)(2).
38. Id. § 402.
39. Id. § 251(c)(2)-(4).
40. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv)-(vi).
41. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).
42. Id. § 251(c)(6).
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munications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who
are not telecommunications carriers. The wholesale rates are to exclude the
portion of retail rates attributable to any marketing, billing, collecting, or
other costs that will be avoided by the LEC.43 State commissions may,
however, restrict resale by categories to avoid anomalies like resale of cir-
cuits bought at residential rates to business customers. 44 A LEC is required
to provide reasonable notice of changes in the information necessary for
•. 45
the transmission and routing of services using the LEC's facilities.
These duties will apply to all LECs, except that carriers with less than
two percent of U.S. access lines and rural LECs may qualify for exemp-
tions. Rural telephone companies are automatically exempt until they re-
ceive bona fide requests for interconnection and the relevant state commis-
sions determine that complying with the requests would not be unduly
economically burdensome. Any carrier other than the BOCs, GTE, and
Sprint may petition state commissions to suspend application of the re-
46quirements on grounds of economic or technical infeasibility.
The following requirements will apply to all LECs, including rural
LECs, except that companies other than the BOCs, GTE, and Sprint may
petition state commissions to suspend the requirements:
" Number portability-the duty to provide, to the extent techni-
cally feasible, the ability to switch carriers without changing
telephone numbers. The BOCs are required to provide interim
number portability through remote call forwarding and compara-
ble arrangements.
" Dialing parity-the ability to have nondiscriminatory access to
telephone numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and
directory listings, with no unreasonable dialing delays.
48
" Access to rights-of-way-the duty to afford access to poles,
ducts, conduits, and rights-of-waZ to competing providers, on the
basis of specified rate structures.
" Reciprocal compensation-the duty to establish reciprocal com-
pensation arrangements with competing local carriers for the
transport and termination of telecommunications.
50
Finally, all telecommunications carriers, without exception, are required to
interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of
43. Id. § 251(c)(4)(A).
44. Id. § 251(c)(4)(B).
45. Id. § 251(c)(5).
46. Id. § 251(f).
47. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi).
48. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)-(viii).
49. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii).
50. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).
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other carriers, and they are enjoined not to install network features, func-
tions, or capabilities that do not comply with industry guidelines and stan-
dards. 1 Telecommunications carriers are defined as providers of the
means of "transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the users choosing, without change in the form or content of
the information sent and received." 53 Therefore, enhanced service provid-
ers are not subject to these requirements.
B. Unleashing the BOCs
The 1996 Act decreed that the BOCs would be unleashed in two
stages. Stage one began when President Clinton signed the bill. The BOCs
were immediately allowed to offer interLATA services originating outside
the states where they have local exchange operations.5 Exceptions include
toll-free services, private line services, or equivalent services that termi-
nate in an in-region state and allow the called party to determine the inter-
LATA carrier.5 The BOCs were also allowed to provide certain
"incidental" interLATA services regardless of where they originate.56 Inci-
dental services include subscription-based audio programming, video pro-
gramming, or other programming services; services offering the capability
for interaction by subscribers to select or respond to such programming;
two-way interactive video services or Internet services over dedicated fa-
cilities to or for elementary and secondary schools; commercial mobile
services; services that permit a customer that is located in one LATA to
retrieve stored information from, or file information for storage in, infor-
mation storage facilities of that company located in another LATA; and
signaling information used for call set-ups and other network functions.
Before providing other in-region interLATA services or engaging in
manufacturing, the BOCs were required to obtain an authorization from
the FCC for each state where they have been operating local exchange fa-
cilities.5' The FCC is directed to issue such authorizations only if it is satis-
fied that the BOC has met the open competition'requirements, but the
Commission is given only ninety days to reach a decision after receiving a
51. Id. § 251(a).
52. Id. § 153(a)(43) (defining telecommunications carriers as "providers of telecom-
munications services").
53. Id. § 153(a)(44) (defining telecommunications).
54. Id. § 271(b)(2).
55. Id. § 2710).
56. Id. § 271(b)(3).
57. Id. § 271(g).
58. Id. § 271(d)(1).
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BOC's application. BOC representatives admitted privately that the
Commission would be hard pressed to render sustainable decisions within
the allotted timetable.W6 Their optimistic prognosis was that the Commis-
sion would grant their applications in the expectation that, thereafter, it
could invoke its continuing authority to issue orders to correct deficien-
cies, enforceable by penalties or suspension of approval to provide long-
distance service. The BOCs assume that the latter remedy will never be in-
voked, unless John Foster Dulles is resurrected and made Chairman of the
FCC.
61
C. Transitional Safeguards
Companies facing competition from the BOCs are understandably
daunted by the prospect of corporate warfare with companies that have
enjoyed long-standing monopolies in large regions of the country. If the
open competition measures have their intended effect, the Bells' monopo-
lies will eventually experience substantial erosion, but that may be a long
time coming. For that reason, Congress required the BOCs to establish
fully separated, arm's length subsidiaries for manufacturing activities
(with the exception of research and royalty arrangements with other manu-
facturers); interLATA information services and origination thereof, other
than the incidental interLATA services described above; out-of-region
services; and activities previously authorized by the court with jurisdiction
over the AT&T Consent Decree. 62 The BOCs are barred altogether from
providing alarm monitoring services for five years,63 except that Amer-
itech's alarm monitoring services are grandfathered. 6
One of the most contentious issues before the conference committee
was how long the separate subsidiary requirements should be maintained.
59. Id. § 271(d)(3).
60. BOC representatives have expressed this view in private conversations with the
author.
61. John Foster Dulles magnified his effectiveness as Secretary of State by convincing
foreign enemies that he was sufficiently crazed to consider using hydrogen bombs as an in-
strument of foreign policy.
62. 47 U.S.C.A. § 272(a).
63. Id. § 275(a)(1).
64. Id. § 275(a)(2). The BOCs were allowed to offer alarm monitoring services begin-
ning in 1991, and Ameritech purchased SecurityLink in December 1994. During hearings,
Ameritech argued for grandfathering in order to develop this business opportunity and
compete with LECs who may offer alarm services. Communications Law Reform: Hearings
on H.R. 1555 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the Committee on Commerce,
104th Cong. 140 (1995) (prepared statement of Richard H. Brown, Vice Chairman, Amer-
itech Corp.).
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The Senate bill would have left that decision up to the FCC;61 the House
bill would have phased separate subsidiaries out after eighteen months,
66
with the exception of so-called "electronic publishing" services, where the
requirements would have been maintained for four years. 67
To some observers, the proposed four-year timetable for electronic
publishing stuck out like a sore thumb, with skeptics speculating that Con-
gress was granting a special favor to the politically powerful newspaper
industry. The conference committee's solution was to extend the separate
subsidiary protections for other affected industries. The BOCs will have to
maintain fully separated subsidiaries for all information services, not just
68
electronic publishing, for four years after the date of enactment. For
manufacturing and long-distance services, the arm's length requirement
will cease to apply three years after the date the BOC is authorized to pro-
vide within-region interLATA services (which will probably be about four
69years after the enactment date). Moreover, the FCC is authorized to pro-
long the requirements for any affected industry if the public interest re-
quires.
D. Universal Service Fund Provisions of the 1996 Act
The authors .of the 1996 Act believed that increased competition
would lead to service innovations and improvements in urban areas, but
powerful senators from states with low population densities correctly per-
ceived that competition would also erode the ILECs' ability to sustain hid-
den subsidies for service to rural areas. Congress responded by setting in
motion a process to ensure that service to high-cost areas would continue
to receive subsidies in the newly competitive environment. It also ex-
panded the scope of services being funded.
The Act required the Commission to establish the Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service (Joint Board) consisting of FCC commission-
ers, state public utility commissioners, and a state-appointed utility con-
sumer advocate to advise the Commission on implementation of the uni-
versal service provisions of the Act.71 The Commission itself was required
to complete the initial phase of the implementation process by May 1997.72
65. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 151 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
163-64.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 156, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 169.
68. 47 U.S.C.A. § 274(g)(2).
69. Id. § 272(f)(1).
70. Id. § 272(f)(l)-(3).
71. Id. § 254(a)(1).
72. Id. § 254(a)(2).
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The most expensive provision in the universal service section ad-
dresses the general needs of rural areas and low-income individuals, the
same interests that had been served by explicit and hidden subsidies before
the Act was adopted:
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income con-
sumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have ac-
cess to telecommunications and information services, including inter-
exchange services and advanced telecommunications and information
services, that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar
services in urban areas.73
New subsidies were mandated to encourage the provision of advanced
telecommunications services to K-12 schools, libraries, and health care
74providers in rural areas.
In 1995, the Congressional Budget Office took a look at expanded
subsidies proposed in the Senate telecommunications bill and concluded
that it would add 7.1 billion dollars to the subsidy requirements over a
four-year period, ramping up to an annual incremental expenditure of 2.9
billion dollars by the fourth year. The final version of the legislation ap-
pears to incorporate all or most of the new subsidy provisions proposed in
the Senate bill, but nobody yet knows how big the subsidy will be, because
the FCC has a significant amount of discretion to fashion subsidy mecha-
nisms as it sees fit, after receiving advice from the Joint Board.
The legislation closed most of the loopholes that had allowed major
consumers of telecommunications services to avoid making subsidy con-
tributions by piecing together their own private networks and attesting that
significant portions of those networks were not interconnected with the
public switched network. The 1996 Act directs and authorizes the FCC to
ensure that all providers of telecommunications services will make an eq-
uitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and ad-
75
vancement of universal service.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE 1996 ACT
A. Strategic Positions of the Players
Interest groups that participated in the legislative process recognized
that the adoption of the 1996 Act was not the end of the game. The real
outcome would depend upon the implementation process at the FCC, state
public utility commissions, and the courts. The most important decisions
73. Id. § 254(b)(3).
74. Id. § 254(h).
75. Id. § 254(b)(4).
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would be expressed in dollars.
For the big ILECs, it was of paramount importance to stop paying
hidden subsidies from services that will soon be exposed to the first on-
slaughts of serious competition. They sought to ensure that subsidy contri-
butions would be imposed in a way that burdens their competitors as much
as the ILECs. And they sought government help to recover their invest-
ments in obsolete equipment that was installed in a heavily regulated mo-
nopoly environment where depreciation schedules were artificially con-
strained by regulators.
The Vice President hoped to see Internet and switched broadband
services provided not only to schools, libraries, and rural health institu-
tions, but eventually to every home and business in America. He had come
to understand that arcane decisions in obscure regulatory proceedings can
have a huge impact on that process. Finally, he also sought to ensure that
low-income constituents would share the opportunities presented by the
new technologies.
IXCs were primarily concerned to see the overall cost of local access
services driven downward. Demand for long-distance services is highly
elastic, and the IXCs knew that the overall volume of business for all long-
distance carriers could increase dramatically if access charges were sig-
nificantly reduced. The IXCs were also keenly aware that the RBOCs were
preparing to compete with them in the interexchange arena, and that their
war chests were funded primarily by revenues obtained from the provision
of local services. The IXCs see the RBOCs as their enemies, and want to
see them weakened.
Most facilities based CLECs wanted to obtain high quality, unbun-
died local loops at prices as low as they could get them, but would pre-
sumably be content to see prices remain high for other parts of ILEC net-
works, since the CLECs plan to install their own switching and interoffice
trunks.76 The CLECs have never said so, but it seems reasonable to assume
that high ILEC price umbrellas for switching and interoffice trunking
would serve the CLECs' interests, at least initially. This analysis could
change if restructured prices cause the CLECs to begin seeking unbundled
elements other than local loops.
Major consumers of telecommunications services were eager to see
competition spread as quickly as possible, provided that competitors enter
the market in response to accurate pricing signals. They knew that if regu-
lators applied price floors below ILEC services in order to protect compe-
76. CLECs affiliated with cable television operators or electrical utilities might eventu-
ally be capable of providing their own local loops. The key issue for them will be reciprocal
compensation payments between CLECs and ILECs for terminating each other's traffic.
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tition for competition's sake, competitors could be enticed to enter markets
where they are not really the most efficient suppliers, and later seek gov-
ernment protection from more efficient operators. Major consumers were
also concerned with the size of universal service subsidies and the mecha-
nisms used to support them, because most major consumers are no longer
in a position to avoid making contributions.
ISPs are a particular class of major consumers. When providing In-
ternet services via private lines to business customers, their interests are
closely aligned with other major consumers, because the 1996 Act renders
all private lines vulnerable to state or federal universal service levies. The
enhanced service providers' exemption from payment of usage-sensitive
interexchange access charges for dial-up services is also under challenge,
77
threatening ISPs' ability to continue using flat-rated local business serv-
ices.
Telecommunications equipment manufacturers generally see them-
selves as arms merchants. They do not care which service providers win
the competitive race so long as they get to sell the hardware and software.
For obvious economic reasons, they favor rapid construction of advanced
networks. Manufacturers of customer premises equipment such as comput-
ers and components of computers, are also increasingly anxious to see
broadband networks deployed.
The interests of ordinary consumers depend upon their existing and
intended consumption patterns-the extent to which they use long-distance
voice services and Internet services today, and the degree of interest they
might have in future access to a broadband telecommunications system ca-
pable of providing two-way, switched video and data services. Tradition-
ally, household consumers have been portrayed as being primarily inter-
ested in keeping bills as low as possible for basic local voice service, but
that is starting to change. The Internet-user community is becoming large
enough to represent a significant political force, and its influence is magni-
fied by the fact that early adopters of that new technology, as for most new
technologies, had more years of formal education and higher incomes than
the rest of the populace. 7' This community's growing influence expressed
itself recently when an organization calling itself the America's Carriers
Telecommunications Association (ACTA) filed a petition with the FCC
77. Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exch. Carriers,
First Report and Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209, para. 50 (1997) [hereinafter Access
Reform First Report and Order] (citing Usage of the Pub. Switched Network by Info. Serv.
and Internet Access Providers, Notice of Inquiry, 12 FCC Rcd. 1210, 5 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 604 (1996)).
78. Chuck Ross, Study: Web Users Watching Prime Time, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 11,
1997, at 18.
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seeking to impose common carrier, utility-style regulation on Internet te-
lephony, and the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry: more than
400,000 Internet users filed informal comments by e-mail.79 Nobody at the
FCC had time to read them, but the agency got the picture and quickly put
the proposal on a procedural track to nowhere.
B. FCC Implementation Proceedings
FCC officials stated on several occasions that they were preparing a
"trilogy" of interrelated major rule makings to implement the core provi-
sions of the 1996 Act. s The phrase had a faint whiff of literary grandiosity
about it, and attracted sarcastic commentary from some of the less discreet
participants in the process.
"We have heard from Moe. Now we are waiting to hear from Larry
and Curly," was the comment offered by William Barr, the former U.S.
Attorney General who is now general counsel of GTE. He was referring to
the First Report and Orders' and the Second Report and Order in the lo-
cal competition proceeding, which were both released on the same day,
and expected subsequent decisions dealing with universal service subsidies
and charges levied upon long-distance carriers for access to local tele-
phone exchanges. Mr. Barr may rue the quotability of his humorous re-
marks, but most of the influential people at the FCC believe that his humor
has sufficient artistic merit to justify at least a limited amount of mercy.
1. The Local Competition Proceeding
In its First Report and Order in the Local Competition Proceeding,
the FCC spent the better part of 700 pages reaching conclusions that were
preordained by the 1996 Act."' Of the previously unresolved issues, the
most important-and the most arcane-was pricing. The ultimate outcome
would have profound implications for competitors, customers, and share-
79. Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 5150, para. 3 (1997).
80. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 6, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition First Report and Order].
81. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P
&F) 1.
82. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Second Report and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,392, 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 484 (1996). As discussed below, parties sought review of the Local
Competition First Report and Order and obtained a stay of the Commission's pricing rules
pending the court's decision on the merits.
83. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P
&F) 1.
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holders.
For most who had been watching the local competition docket from a
safe distance-that is, those who declined the opportunity to read the
17,000 pages of comments initially filed in the proceeding-the general
expectation was that the FCC would seek to prevent the ILECs from load-
ing high prices onto monopoly bottlenecks (primarily local loops) while
restraining the ILECs from setting prices below cost for parts of the net-
work that are more vulnerable to competition (e.g., the trunk lines that
connect ILEC switches to each other). The Local Competition First Report
and Order made a good start in that direction,8 but it also went much fur-
ther in another direction, by addressing the overall level of prices charged
by the ILECs.85
Historically, regulators have usually allowed or required public utili-
ties to set their prices primarily on the basis of so-called "embedded"
costs. For most practical purposes, embedded costs are based on the prices
that the regulated entity paid for its assets, minus whatever depreciationS • 86
charges it has taken in the interim. In the telecommunications industry,
the first and most determined assaults on the embedded costs paradigm
came from the predivestiture AT&T.
Faced with competition from new and hungry companies using the
latest technology, AT&T knew that it could not retain its big customers if
it continued to charge them prices based on obsolete and costly equipment.
In those days and until quite recently, the FCC Common Carrier Bureau
exerted most of its regulatory efforts toward enforcing price floors rather
than price ceilings, to prevent predatory pricing in sectors exposed to com-
petition. AT&T and, later, the divested BOCs, sought permission to set
prices for services exposed to competition on the basis of long-run incre-
mental costs (LRIC, pronounced "lyric" by the cognoscente). To the extent
that LRIC-based prices for competitive services fell below embedded
costs, the incumbent carriers sought to ascribe as much of those costs as
possible to monopoly services or, where that proved infeasible, simply
wrote off the unrecovered investment. AT&T, for example, took multibil-
lion dollar write-offs for obsolete microwave equipment when Sprint and
MCI challenged it with fiber optics.87
84. Id. para. 696.
85. Id. paras. 672-700.
86. Id. para. 632.
87. See Modification of the Comm'n's Depreciation Prescription Practices as Applied
to AT&T and the Prescription of Revised AT&T Depreciation Rates, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 8567, para. 23, 67 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1989); Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Public Notice, 4 FCC Rcd. 6814 (1989)
(citing AT&T Press Release, Dec. 1, 1988, which announced a $6.7 billion write-down of
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LRIC-based pricing was a useful theory for the ILECs when its bright
illumination was tightly focused on services exposed to competition, but it
has proved inconvenient for them in the context of unbundled intercon-
nection. The resulting course of debate has reconfirmed the generally ob-
served phenomenon that economic principles espoused by private compa-
nies are typically driven by business realities more than academic theory.
Confronted with legislation requiring them to set prices for all of the seg-
regated piece-parts of their networks, incumbent LECs generally con-
tended that prices should be based on embedded costs, that is, costs based
on the individual LEC's existing network design and technology instead of
the idealized least-cost, most efficient network design based on the latest
technology. 8 The United States Telephone Association (USTA) argued
that if competitors want to use an incumbent LEC's embedded plant, com-
petitors should pay for the existing plant, not some theoretical, more effi-
cient plant based on current technology. 9
In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the FCC enraged
the ILECs by grabbing the LRIC spotlight, which the ILECs' economists
had helped build, and shining it on monopoly bottlenecks, as well as the
parts of ILEC networks that had previously been exposed to competition.
The order directed the ILECs to set the prices for each of their unbundled
piece-parts on the basis of forward-looking long-run economic costs. 90 The
Commission also established pricing rules that minimize joint and com-
mon costs, limiting the ILECs' ability to ascribe costs underlying com-
petitive services to monopoly services.9'
In comments filed before the Commission issued its order, USTA
cited estimates that a solely forward-looking, pricing methodology would
preclude ILECs from recouping between 13 billion and 18.4 billion dollars
in embedded costs. 92 Looked at from another perspective, this could trans-
late into double-digit multibillion dollar savings for ILEC customers, espe-
cially the long-distance callers that rely on ILECs to complete their con-
nections to end users.
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and
others challenged the Local Competition First Report and Order as over-
stepping the FCC's jurisdictional authority.93 Incumbent LECs argued that
network analog equipment and related charges and acceleration of network digitization).
88. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 657, 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1.
89. Id. para. 639.
90. Id. paras. 620-22.
91. Id. paras. 672-732.
92. Id. para. 658 (citing USTA Comments).
93. See id. para. 71; Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
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establishing a rate structure that does not permit recovery of embedded
costs is confiscatory, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 94
In October of 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stayed the Commission's pricing rules for unbundled interconnection em-
bodied in the Local Competition First Report and Order pending a review
of the merits.95 It quickly became apparent, however, that the court had
merely stayed the FCC's interpretation of pricing standards embodied in
the 1996 Act. The court's order had no effect on the statutory timetables
for negotiation, arbitration, and approval of interconnection agreements by
96
state public utility commissions. CLECs still had the right to seek arbi-
tration by the states when they were unable to reach satisfactory agree-
ments with the ILECs, and the state commissions were required to con-
clude the resolution of any unresolved issues no later than nine months
after the date on which the ILEC received the request for interconnection
from the CLEC.97
In February of 1997, an FCC official reported that thirty-three of the
thirty-five states that had adopted pricing standards by that time had cho-
sen to follow the pricing methodology for unbundled interconnection ar-
ticulated in the Local Competition First Report and Order." At that point,
observers began to wonder what, if anything, the ILECs had gained from
the Eighth Circuit stay, or stood to gain if the Eighth Circuit confirmed its
tentative conclusions on the jurisdictional issue. If the FCC's explanation
of its recommended approach was sufficiently coherent to persuade the
states to follow it voluntarily, there might be no need to compel them to do
so. Of course, it remained to be seen how the states would implement a
model that they had adopted in principle. In the meantime, it began to look
as if the ILECs were back to square one.
In July of 1997, the Eighth Circuit vacated most of the FCC's pricing
rules but affirmed the Commission's conclusion that unbundled network
elements can be used by CLECs to provide exchange access services. 99 The
94. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 670, 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1; Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753.
95. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 117
S. Ct. 429 (1996).
96. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 252, 47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (West
Supp. 1997).
97. Id. § 252(b)(4)(C).
98. Charles Atlas, Associate Chief, FCC Common Carrier Bureau, Presentation at
Dow, Lohnes & Albertson/George Washington University Seminar on the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 (February 20, 1996) (notes of presentation on file with Author).
99. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753.
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court vacated a Commission rule that had empowered CLECs to direct
ILECs to recombine network elements, and an order on petition for re-
hearing voided a provision that blocked the ILECs from disassembling
network elements if the CLECs requested that they refrain from doing
100SO.
The Eighth Circuit decision will be appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, state utility commissions are moving beyond interim de-
cisions to adopt permanent pricing standards for unbundled network ele-
ments. By the time the case reaches the Supreme Court, the ILECs may
have decided that a jurisdictional argument on pricing issues will buy them
little, even if they win it. If so, their most likely alternative would be to
concentrate their legal firepower on their fallback argument, that FCC-
style pricing standards are an unconstitutional taking of property.
2. The Universal Service Proceeding
The first tremors of the universal service proceeding were felt in No-
vember of 1996, when the Joint Board recommended that the FCC begin to
implement the Universal Service Fund by providing 2.25 billion dollars
per year to subsidize Internet connections for schools and libraries, in-
cluding internal wiring.' 10 "Plain-vanilla" Internet services would be eligi-
ble for the subsidy. 12 Another category of the subsidy fund would support
telecommunications services provided to rural health institutions, poor103 x
people, and users in rural areas. When combined with subsidies for high-
cost (mostly rural) areas and low-income individuals, the overall size of
the fund was expected to reach between 5 and 14 billion dollars annually,
depending upon how regulators calculate telephone company costs. The
Clinton Administration's annual budget proposal for 1998, for example,
projected that the FCC's Universal Service Fund would grow from 1.4 bil-
lion dollars in fiscal year 1997, to 2.24 billion dollars in 1998, to 6.3 bil-
lion dollars in 1999, to 11.3 billion dollars in 2000, to 12.2 billion dollars
in 2001, and finally to 12.8 billion in 2002.'04 These numbers differ radi-
cally from the estimates that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) pro-
vided during the legislative process in 1995, when the CBO projected that
the Universal Service Fund would reach 2.9 billion dollars by its fourth
100. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321, 1997 WL 658718 (8th Cir. Oct. 14, 1997).
101. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Recommended Decision, 12 FCC Rcd.
87, paras. 438-630, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996), amended and adopted by Report and
Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997).
102. Id. paras. 441-65.
103. Id. paras. 631-752.
104. BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1998 262 (1997).
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year. The Administration's estimate for the same year was nearly four
times as large. Yet, the subsequent expressions of consternation from
Capitol Hill were reminiscent of the famous scene at the conclusion of the
movie Casablanca, when Claude Raines's police chief character expressed
"shock" at hearing of misbehavior that for years had been going on under
his nose. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains no limit on the
Commission's largesse in dispensing universal service funds, except for
vaguely worded language referring to the public interest. 05
In May of 1997, the FCC adopted most of the Joint Board's recom-
mendations and added an additional 400 million dollars per year for rural
health service providers, bringing the total amount of new subsidies to 2.65
billion dollars per year, when funds for schools and libraries are in-
cluded. 106 The Commission decided to continue studying proposed cost
models for service to rural areas, leaving observers to wonder which end of
the 5 to 14 billion dollars per year range of estimates for that purpose was
most likely to prevail. The agency decided that it would generate the re-
quired funds by collecting a percentage of gross retail revenues from most
telecommunications providers. The providers were allowed flexibility to
decide on their own how to pass the levy through to end users.'0
7
In July of 1997, the Commission released a Second Order and a
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that moved the agency toward a
clearer delineation of universal service costs and how the process will be
administered.'O' In the Second Order, the Commission for the first time
provided percentage estimates for the levies that may be applied to retail
telecommunications revenues to support federal universal service pro-
grams. Based on those numbers and subsequent discussions between the
Author and Commission staff, it appeared that an initial levy rate of ap-
proximately 1.6% would be applied to gross retail revenues from intra-
state, interstate, and international telecommunications to subsidize service
to schools, libraries, and rural health care providers,'09 and that a 2.3% levy
105. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 254(b)(7), 47 U.S.C.A. §
254(b)(7) (West Supp. 1997).
106. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 109 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Serv. Report and Order].
107. Id. para. 853.
108. Changes to the Bd. of Dirs. of the Nat'l Exch. Carrier Ass'n., Inc. and Fed.-State
Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order and Second Order on Reconsideration, 62 Fed.
Reg. 41,294 (1997); Federal-State Bd. on Universal Serv. and Forward-Looking Mecha-
nism for High Cost Support for Non-Rural LECs, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
62 Fed. Reg. 42,457 (1997).
109. The 1.6% figure is derived by dividing $2.65 billion-the annual subsidy for
schools, libraries, and rural health subsidy funds-by $170 billion-the FCC staff's internal
estimate of intrastate, interstate, and international retail revenues of U.S. telecommunica-
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on interstate retail revenues may be required to continue existing explicit
subsidies for high-cost telephone companies and low-income individu-
als." ° However, FCC staff estimates implied that the levy on interstate re-
tail revenues for support of service to rural areas could approach 6% in
1999, when the high-cost fund is expanded to cover rural areas situated
within the territories of larger ILECs." 1 These amounts would be in addi-
tion to the expected 1.6% levy for schools, libraries, and health services
applied to interstate and intrastate revenues by the FCC. Meanwhile, the
average for state universal service levies could rise as high as 11% in
1999. In combination, the potential liability for all of these levies could
exceed 7% of gross interstate retail telecommunications revenues " and
approach 13% of intrastate revenues in the average state, with rates poten-
tially much higher in individual states.
1 14
These numbers reflect the high-end cost-of-service estimates being
advocated by the ILECs. The levy rates would be much lower if the cost
models being advocated by IXCs are adopted. All of the estimates will be
subject to change after telecommunications providers file retail revenue
reports in the fall of 1997. Under any conceivable scenario, however, uni-
versal service levies will be sizable enough to qualify as real money, even
by Washington standards.
The situation is somewhat reminiscent of an old New Yorker cartoon
tons providers.
110. The 2.3% figure is derived by dividing $1.5 billion-the approximate amount of
existing federal explicit subsidies to high-cost telephone companies-by $65 billion-the
FCC staff's internal estimate of interstate-only gross retail revenues.
11i. The 6% figure is derived by assuming that interstate ratepayers will provide 25% of
the $15 billion per year that might be required to subsidize service to high-cost areas served
by the larger "nonrural" telephone companies ($3.75 billion) plus $.4 billion to continue
existing subsidies to smaller "rural" telephone companies. The required funding would be
produced by applying a 6% levy against $65 billion, the FCC staff's estimate of gross inter-
state retail revenues of telecommunications providers.
112. This estimate assumes that states will be responsible for 75% of high-cost support,
that total high-cost support requirements could be as high as $15 billion per year, and that
gross intrastate retail telecommunications revenues are about $105 billion, according to in-
ternal FCC staff estimates. Multiplying $105 billion by an 11% levy rate would produce
$11.25 billion, approximately 75% of a $15 billion funding requirement. The levy rate
would vary from state-to-state, and funding requirements will ultimately depend upon state
estimates of funding requirements for service to high-cost areas.
113. As explained above, the FCC could apply a 6% levy against interstate retail reve-
nues to support the federal share of high-cost area support, and, in addition, the FCC would
apply a 1.6% levy against interstate and intrastate revenues to support subsidies to schools,
libraries, and health service providers. The combined effect would be to produce a 7.6%
levy against interstate revenues.
114. Adding 11%, the estimate explained above for state universal service levies, plus
the FCC's 1.6% levy against interstate and intrastate revenues, would produce a combined
levy rate against intrastate revenues of 12.6%.
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depicting the entrance to the House Ways and Means Committee's hearing
room. Workmen were pictured adding, "The Powerful" above the "House
Ways and Means Committee" sign. In the old days, that was one of the few
entities that was empowered to make routine decisions involving tens of
billions of dollars, and even they had to get approval from the Congress as
a whole. The FCC does not have to get approval from anybody, as long as
it satisfies the courts that it has complied with the public interest standards
in the 1996 Act. Perhaps a sign should be placed above the entrance to the
FCC that reads, "The Really Powerful." The sign could actually be mass
produced, because similar statements could be made about the state com-
missions, which will be setting intrastate levy rates.
For big ILECs, the new and expanded universal service funds will be
used in part to replace hidden subsidies with explicit subsidies. ILECs will
continue to be the main subsidy recipients. From the perspective of users
and providers that have not been required to make subsidy contributions in
the past, however, the levies will look and feel very much like new taxes.
3. The Access Charge Proceeding
In its access charge reform docket, the Commission announced that it
was reexamining ILEC charges for completion of interstate interexchange
calls.' 15 The Commission initially seemed to recognize that, if access
charges were not made consistent with the prices being established for un-
bundled network elements, IXCs might reduce their use of ILEC access
services and substitute use of unbundled network elements, either pieced
together or obtained in a rebundled package after directing the ILECs to
refrain from ever separating the "unbundled" elements. The latter approach
was a permissible option under the FCC's local competition rules,116 but
carriers were not certain how perfect a substitute unbundled interconnec-
tion would prove to be for traditional access services. The answer would
be affected by state commission pricing decisions, which were still in
process at the time (and will likely remain in process for the indefinite fu-
ture). It was also becoming increasingly apparent that the process of ob-
taining unbundled network elements from the ILECs would be slow, pain-
ful, and extremely complicated, because the ILECs lack the will and,
perhaps, the ability to develop user-friendly operational support services.
With those matters unresolved, access charge prices continued to be very
115. See Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exch. Carri-
ers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Third Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry, 11
FCC Rcd. 21,354, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 604 (1996).
116. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, paras. 292-
95, 337-38, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996).
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important: carriers and other interested parties swarmed the FCC and be-
gan taking out full-page advertisements on access charge issues in The
Washington Post.
In May of 1997, the FCC released its First Report and Order in the
access charge proceeding. 17 IXCs were disappointed to learn that the
Commission had not adopted a flash-cut reduction in access charges con-
sistent with the forward-looking cost models that the agency had been
promoting in its local competition and universal service proceedings. The
agency chose instead to accelerate the annual rate at which ILECs will be
required to reduce their access charges. Beyond that, the Commission indi-
cated that it would rely on the availability of unbundled interconnection as
an alternative to drive access prices downward.
That the Commission had flinched in the face of intense lobbying by
the ILECs was not particularly surprising. More intriguing was the
agency's decision to restructure the manner in which access charges are
collected. Previously, providers of dial-up interstate interexchange service
had been required to pay per-minute charges for access to local exchanges,
equal to about forty percent of prices charged to long-distance callers. l 8
The Commission decided to begin phasing out all per-minute access
charges that had been used to pay for local exchange equipment whose
cost does not vary with usage, including the wires that connect homes to
telephone company offices. To replace that source of revenues, the Com-
mission decided to increase flat monthly charges applied directly to multi-
line business users, and it would phase in flat, per-subscriber charges to be
paid by IXCs for access to the local exchange.
It remained to be seen how the IXCs would flow through the new flat
monthly charges to end users, but the likely effect on most dial-up users of
interstate long-distance services could have been a sharp reduction in per-
minute charges coupled with an increase in flat monthly charges. Some
carriers might even have considered offering unlimited long-distance call-
ing for flat monthly charges, even though the IXCs would continue to pay
some per-minute charges for access to local exchanges. In the real world,
these hypotheticals represent wishful thinking, however, because long-
overdue reform of the access charge system did not occur in isolation. It
occurred at precisely the same time that the Commission was implement-
ing the new universal service subsidy system. The Universal Service Fund
will not be funded by per-minute access charges, but it will be funded by a
117. Access Reform First Report and Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997).
118. These per-minute payments included a "carrier common line charge" to cover the
federal allocation of costs for wires connecting end user premises to telephone company
switches. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.105 (1996).
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percentage levy on retail revenues. 9 On the same day, the Commission
had decided to phase out one kind of usage-sensitive charge and to phase
in another.
To those who understood what was happening, the sense of emo-
tional deflation resembled what proponents of nuclear energy must have
experienced when they began to realize that atomic power would not be
too cheap to bill, despite their high hopes that it would be. In the telecom-
munications case, however, the too-cheap-to-bill scenario was not a tech-
nological impossibility. It had been defeated by a political process.
V. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S GOALS
While telecommunications policy wonks were working toward a too-
cheap-to-bill solution for long-distance telephone services, Albert Gore
was nurturing a different kind of vision. For the past decade, as a Senator
and then as Vice President, he has been advocating construction of a
switched broadband network capable of providing two-way video and
high-speed data communications to every home and business in America.
As ambitious as that prospect may seem, it is perfectly in tune with a
tradition of nation-building that began long before the Interstate Highway
System. When America's commerce consisted primarily of tangible goods,
Thomas Jefferson dispatched Meriwether Lewis to find a riverine route to
the West Coast. Later, government land grants played a major role in the
construction of coast-to-coast railways. The U.S. Postal Service sprang
from a similar impulse: the famous quotation inscribed on the main post
office in New York City, "Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of
night will stay these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed
rounds," originated not with Benjamin Franklin, as many assume, but from
Herodotus, describing the mounted couriers of the ancient Persian em-
pire. 120
Today, with trade in information absorbing an increasing share of the
national economy, the communications infrastructure is more important
than ever before. However, the Vice President wants a system that will be
capable of transmitting more than words and numbers; he wants images as
well.
To those who may consider image transmission a trivial or superficial
concern, it is worth noting that many historians mark the beginning of the
High Middle Ages as occurring around the time when Abbot Suger ad-
119. Universal Serv. Report and Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109, paras. 844, 849,
852 (1997). The Commission says it will allow carriers the flexibility to decide how they
should recover their percentage contributions from end users. Id. para. 853.
120. HERODOTUS, THE HIsToRIEs 647 (George Rawlinson trans., 1997).
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vised the King of France to build the first Gothic-style cathedral at St.
Denis, as an expression of royal piety, wealth, and power. Half the cost of
the typical Gothic cathedral was accounted for by windows: the main pur-
pose of the new architectural style was to expand the space available for
stained glass.' 2' Kings and kingmakers expended enormous resources to
build showcases for colorful images which, in the context of the time, had
powerful cultural and political overtones. Albert Gore was exposed to the
same kinds of images as a student at St. Albans, on the grounds of the Na-
tional Cathedral in Washington, and it is possible that Suger's legacy
resonated with the future Vice President. Today, Vice President Gore
stands beside the throne and calls for a modem infrastructure capable of
sustaining a different kind of image transmission, more utilitarian but no
less dramatic.
The Vice President has shown considerable flexibility in the tools he
will use in pursuit of that goal, and there is every reason to believe that he
and his advisors will be open to advice from all sides of the political spec-
trum. There is nothing in the Vice President's history to suggest that he is
inclined to choose deregulation for the sake of deregulation. He and his
prot6g6s, including the Administration's appointees to the FCC, will fol-
low a deregulatory approach if they are presented with convincing argu-
ments that it will work better than the alternatives, but they will not recoil
from an interventionist approach if it appears more promising to them.
VI. How To PAY FOR A SWITCHED BROADBAND NETWORK
The analysis of funding issues can be simplified if we assume that the
FCC and the states will continue along the path that most of them seem to
be following already, that is, preparing to set prices for unbundled network
elements on the basis of long-run incremental costs and that rates for both
interexchange access services and local services will be transitioned to
levels that will be sustainable in the face of unbundled interconnection.
The analysis can be further simplified by assuming that the FCC and the
states will continue to allow CLECs to provide exchange access service
using unbundled network elements, without requiring them to deploy fa-
cilities of their own before doing so, and that regulations will prevent
ILECs from interposing unnecessary complications into the process of re-
connecting unbundled elements to each other. This kind of pure arbitrage
should drive access charges downward faster, though not necessarily as far
..... 122
as, facilities-based competition.
121. JOSEPH & FRANcEs GIES, LiE IN A MEDIEVAL CrrY 149 (Harper & Row 1981)
(1969).
122. The efficiency of the arbitrage process will be constrained by the decision of the
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Those assumptions allow us to focus on the most important unan-
swered question: how to generate the multibillions of dollars per year that
will be necessary to support the Universal Service Fund. As reflected in
nearly 200,000 pages of comments filed in the Commission's access re-
form and universal service proceedings,'2 3 the collective intelligence of the
communications bar has been able to produce only three viable alterna-
tives:
(a) A usage-based fee, expressed as a proportion of revenues gener-
ated.
(b) A flat monthly charge, levied directly on end users or indirectly
through interexchange carriers.
(c) A combination of (a) and (b).
All of these alternatives have serious flaws. We know from experi-
ence that usage-based fees can seriously depress usage of the network.
Prior to 1985, IXCs supported the entire federal allocation of local ex-
change costs through usage-based charges, generally by paying several
cents per minute for dial-up interstate calls traversing local telephone ex-
changes. Beginning in June of 1985, the FCC directed the LECs to begin
reducing those per-minute fees and to make up the shortfall by phasing in
flat-rated subscriber line charges (SLCs, pronounced "slicks"), with caps
for the flat-rated charges eventually rising to $3.50 per month for residen-
tial lines and $6 per month for business lines in 1989."A The average price
of dialed interstate long-distance service declined by more than forty per-
cent between 1983 and 1993 in inflation adjusted terms, and interstate
calling volume, measured in minutes, more than doubled.25 Some econo-
mists maintain that all, or nearly all, of the decline in dialed interstate
long-distance rates during that period is attributable to flow-throughs of
reductions in the LECs' per-minute exchange access charges, which in turn
126
were made possible by substitution of flat-rated SLCs.
The SLC was justified in part by the fact that many of the costs asso-
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, on rehearing, to vacate an FCC rule that had blocked
ILECs from disassembling network elements when CLECs ask them to refrain from doing
so. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321, 1997 WL 658718 (8th Cir. Oct. 14, 1997).
123. Universal Serv. Report and Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 368 (statement of FCC
Chairman Reed E. Hundt).
124. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2953, paras.
4-6, 13, 30, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1409 (1987).
125. COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (citing FCC Common Car-
rier Bureau, Industry Analysis Division).
126. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE
PROMISE OF REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1995).
Competition among carriers has been more intense in services provided to major consum-
ers.
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ciated with local exchange telephone service are fixed, that is, their costs
do not vary with the level of traffic traversing them. The most obvious ex-
ample is the local loop. If subscribers can be induced to pay for fixed costs
up-front, then usage-based fees can be reduced. By paying an extra forty-
two dollars per year for residential lines or seventy-two dollars per year for
business service, users obtained much lower per-minute charges for inter-
state long-distance services and, as a consequence, dramatically increased
the volume of such calls.1 7 The revised rate structure was also more con-
sistent with economic theories that recommend pricing on the basis of de-
mand elasticities, with price reductions applied first to services with the
highest elasticities of demand.
The FCC's Access Reform First Report and Order would have com-
pleted that process by phasing out all per-minute exchange access charges
for the support of equipment whose cost does not vary with usage. The
eventual result would have been a dramatic reduction in per-minute
charges for interstate long-distance service.
The Universal Service Report and Order has the opposite effect.
When usage-sensitive levies are applied to all telecommunications services
to support an expanded universal service fund, the effect will be to limit
the dramatic benefits that were achieved, with much courage in the face of
significant political opposition, when the SLC was phased in. It will also
undercut similar but more far-reaching benefits that could have been
achieved by the Access Reform First Report and Order. It is not incon-
ceivable that prices charged for dial-up long-distance services could begin
to rise if new subsidies continue to proliferate. Worse, the depressant ef-
fect could affect all telecommunications services, including those used to
support the Internet and proprietary on-line services, because rate increases
will inevitably flow through to users.
The intensity of the depressant effect will depend upon the amount of
money required to support the Universal Service Fund. The larger the
benefits bestowed upon schools, libraries, health institutions, poor people,
and people living in rural areas, the greater the drag will be on services
provided to others.
In fairness to the Vice President, one must acknowledge that the 2.65
billion dollars per year that the FCC is bestowing on schools, libraries, and
127. COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (citing FCC Common Car-
rier Bureau, Industry Analysis Division). The amounts quoted are annualized subscriber
line charges, which appear on end-user telephone bills and cover part of the federal share of
subscriber line costs, which were previously covered in their entirety by per-minute carrier
common line charges applied to IXCs. See Access Reform First Report and Order, 7
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209, para. 37 (1997).
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health providers is a fraction of the 10 billion dollars plus that the system
awards every year to all rural residents-upper-, middle-, and lower-class
alike. In fairness to the senators who represent low-density states, one
should acknowledge that they, too, have a vision. One Senator tells a
charming story about the first felony committed in his hometown, after
which it was discovered that hardly anybody there bothered to lock their
doors--even when leaving for extended vacations. The mere knowledge
that such places exist is a salve to the spirit of all Americans, including
those who live in large cities; yet, it gives one pause when the Senator pro-
vides the postscript to this idyll: providing telephone service to that town
requires a monthly subsidy of approximately $200 per home per month.
After hearing that story, I told the Senator that I hope one day to visit
his hometown, but that I also wonder how he can justify funding those
subsidies by applying a surcharge to telephone services used by urban
residents who sleep in bathtubs to avoid being hit by bullets. Would it not
make more sense to support such subsidies from general tax revenues? The
Senator answered truthfully and candidly: it might make sense, but if peo-
ple knew what they were being asked to pay, they would not pay it.
That, unfortunately, is the whole point. Rural senators and the Vice
President, having discovered the FCC's ability to redirect billions of dol-
lars with arcane regulatory formulas, have discovered a magic elixir. Drink
the potion, and their respective dreams and visions are brought to fruition,
without having to go through the House Ways and Means Committee or
the Congress as a whole.
The bureaucrats who taught the Vice President how to pursue his vi-
sions without dipping into tax revenues, by jury-rigging the regulatory
system instead, have enlarged the appetite of a monster that has been dor-
mant for a long time but is beginning to grow again. It could grow again
when somebody else has a vision that costs money. In time, the process
could begin to drag the whole system down.
The important question now is, not what should have been done at
the beginning, but what can be done now to correct the situation without
abandoning the Administration's vision of the Information Superhighway,
and without destroying a key element of rural economies. The first thing
that needs to be done is to form a reasoned consensus about how big the
Universal Service Fund should be. The Joint Board began the process
backward, when it recommended spending 2.25 billion dollars per year for
schools and libraries before it, or anybody else, was able to estimate how
much should also be spent on rural health institutions, poor people, or peo-
128. The Senator related this story in a not-for-attribution conversation with the Author.
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ple living in rural areas. We need to start with a budget for the whole
package, and then decide how to divide it among the targeted beneficiaries,
in an open, public, and accountable process.
This kind of process need not necessarily lead to cuts in funding for
schools, libraries, and health institutions, nor should it leave residents of
rural areas without access to telecommunications. But it might lead to a
reassessment of what minimally acceptable connectivity should mean. To-
day, for example, there are wireless technologies that could provide access
at costs far below the amounts that telephone companies spend to extend
wires to remote areas. Wireless service can support mobile telephony and
vastly expanded calling areas, but it sometimes require a tradeoff in quality
and available talk time. Would the tradeoffs be worth it? Perhaps not to
users accustomed to unlimited subsidies, with no visible costs or conse-
quences. In the real world, though, there are always costs and conse-
quences and tradeoffs to be made. That is what most people do in their pri-
vate interactions with the economy, and it is what we pay elected
representatives to do.
The universal service program could use a fresh look from people
with different perspectives, especially people who are accustomed to
making tradeoffs. One way to do that would be to provide opportunities for
review by the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance
Committee, and the House and Senate Budget Committees, as well as the
Commerce Committees-the traditional sources of FCC oversight. What-
ever process is followed should make it possible for somebody to calculate
a bill for every constituent, whether the funding comes out of taxes, phone
bills, or some yet-to-be-imagined source of revenues. Members of the
Commerce Committees may complain that such expanded oversight in-
fringes upon their turf. The answer to those complaints can be simple and
forthright: "You have been writing blank checks. If you don't want others
looking over your shoulders, act responsibly."
Perhaps it is unrealistic to hope that such a process would do any-
thing more than minimize harm; but, in the end, minimizing harm may suf-
fice to achieve the Vice President's original vision. The competitive parts
of the American telecommunications sector have displayed enormous
vigor and creativity, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, if properly
implemented, can allow those qualities to express themselves in the local
exchange, as it sheds the carapace of its monopolistic past. A fully com-
petitive telecommunications sector will accomplish what government
would fail to do if it tried: generate ideas and purposes that government
could never imagine, and make them reality, as it has already begun to do
with fax machines, telecommunicating computers, self-healing fiber rings,
and the infant entity we call the Internet.
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